Financial products are unstandardized and subject to a great deal of uncertainty. They tend to concentrate geographically because of the reduction in information costs resulting from close contacts. Concentration leads to economies of scale and encourages external economies. Great financial centers enjoy a high degree of persistence but are not immune from decline and eventual demise. Yet, their achievements are passed along in a an evolutionary manner. In revisiting the historical record of seven international financial centers -Florence, Venice, Genoa, Antwerp, Amsterdam, London and New York-the paper finds evidence of a long evolutionary chain of banking and finance. As to the present and the future, the forces of integration are likely to give an additional boost to the persistence of international financial centers.
I. INTRODUCTION
The most important insights on financial centers remain those of Charles P. Kindleberger (1974) who wrote his classic study more than thirty years ago. In that essay, he advanced the thesis that financial centers perform a medium-of-exchange and store-of-value functions similar to money.
The community gains in dealing with a single center instead of dealing with many locations; and these gains are proportional to the shift from N(N-1)/2 to (N-1), where N is the number of locations. The reasons why a center emerges are the same reasons why a currency emerges.
People use money rather than barter because they economize on information and transaction costs. Money would not exist in a frictionless world, one devoid of transaction and information costs. Similarly, people execute financial transactions in a financial center in preference to executing financial transactions over a wide geographical domain because they save on transaction and information costs.
Financial products are unstandardized: they differ in terms of promised yield, expected yield, market risk, credit risk, maturity, liquidity, currency of denomination, and country of issue.
Furthermore, the variations in the price of these products are largely explained by news.
Unstandardized output facing a great deal of uncertainty tends to concentrate geographically because of the reduction in information costs resulting from face-to-face contacts. Concentration, in turn, leads to economies of scale. Concentration tends to occur in places, usually cities with large ports, that are hubs of commerce, both domestic and international. Commerce pulls banking and finance, which in turn attract the customers, corporate headquarters. External economies come along as hubs create a host of services that are supportive of banking and finance: accountants, computer programmers, information technology specialists, and lawyers, to mention a few. On the other hand, the lower cost of information in local markets for local products, differences in time zone, and congestion lead in the opposite direction. A tug of war ensues between centralization and decentralization.
Kindleberger identifies three attributes of great financial centers: a banking tradition, a central bank, and a strong currency. Financial centers and currencies tend to organize themselves in hierarchical order and Kindleberger (1983) predicted that the creation of a European currency and a European central bank would boost the development of a European money and capital market, which is right on the mark.
The purpose of this essay is to revisit the historical record of international financial centers, but with a much longer time horizon than used by Kindleberger and, more recently, by Youssef Cassis (2006) , who focuses on the 19 th and 20 th century. A long time horizon has several advantages. First, given the degree of persistence of centers, examination of long periods of time gives us a deeper understanding of the forces that lead great financial centers, not only to rise, but also to decline. Second, a mixture of evolution and 'revolutions' has characterized the history of banking and finance (Fratianni and Spinelli 2006) . Evolutions evoke a smooth rate of change, revolutions drastic changes. A long sweep of history is best suited to sort out exceptional sharp changes from smooth evolutionary ones. Finally, while banking concentration tends to coincide with finance concentration, the mix of the two products is not constant over time.
Banking, in the extended sense of encompassing central banking, plays a critical role in the formation of financial centers, but the importance of finance rises over time.
The adopted strategy of this paper is to revisit the record of seven great international financial centers --Florence, Venice, Genoa, Antwerp, Amsterdam, London, and New York -so as to identify attributes of success, possible reasons for declines, and extent to which their achievements have been passed along in the evolutionary chain of finance. The sample is small but fits the purpose of looking at best practices rather than their distribution. The structure of the paper is as follows. I begin with the link between financial deepening and financial centers (Section II). I then examine the record of the seven centers (Section III), followed by an evaluation and implications for the future(Section IV). I conclude with a brief discussion on the relevance of the paper for the mix of centralized and decentralized markets in a global financial environment (Section V). "financial revolutions" were far from being random events; they were supported by three basic pillars: (i) innovations in financial institutions, instruments and markets, (ii) an institutional mechanism through which the debtor commits not to renege on debt, and the presence of a public bank (Fratianni and Spinelli 2006) .
II. FINANCIAL DEEPENING AND FINANCIAL CENTERS
The best known "financial revolution" is the English, which was sparked by the Glorious Revolution of 1688. With the ascendancy of Parliament, property rights in England became more secure and government gained credibility in its commitment not to renege on debt (North and Weingast 1989) . In 1694, Parliament created a public bank, the Bank of England. The Bank was authorized to engineer a debt-for-equity swap, that is to transform government debt bearing a fixed rate of interest into equity. The shares issued by the Bank of England, but also those by the East India Company and the South Sea Company, were well received by the public and became increasingly marketable and liquid. Markets for these securities thickened and their underlying transaction costs declined (Neal 1990 
III. SEVEN GREAT FINANCIAL CENTERS
Medieval Florence, Venice and Genoa were at the frontier of economic development and capitalism from the mid 1200s to the early part of the 1600s. The key to their success were commerce, international trade, and finance. Despite the lack of a harbor, Florence was very successful in trading and banking with Northern European countries. Genoa and Venice were maritime economies and fought for dominance of overseas routes. Geographic specialization occurred after Genoa and Venice fought their last war in 1378-8: the Venetians specialized in the East and the Genoese in the West, while both shared, with Florence, the North of Europe. Genoa and Venice shared republican political institutions and the rule of law, which gave them legitimacy and credibility to issue large amounts of long-term and marketable debt. Venice had a strong and stable government, willing and able to interfere with the economy. The state in Genoa was less interventionist because it was more "factious and unstable," as Machiavelli noted in his
Istorie fiorentine (1965, . Republican Florence was closer to Genoa than to Venice, but after 1434 the rules of the political game were set by the Medici family.
1 All three city states had great financial centers by the standard of the times, but Florence first and Genoa later had true international character. Venice was more inward than outward in banking and finance. There was a heavy presence of outside bankers in Venice, especially from Florence, and their business was geared predominantly to the domestic market.
Florence
Florence was a great banking centre by the mid 1200s (Sapori 1950) . Florentine 'compagnie' -as the merchant-bankers of the time were called-like Bardi, Cerchi, Frescobaldi, Pazzi, and Peruzzi, among others-were active at home and abroad. 2 They set operations in England to purchase wool for the big wool and cloth industry in Florence, to collect papal contributions, to lend funds to belligerent sovereigns, and to collect customs fees which were given to them as a guarantee for their loans (Sapori, . The merchant-bankers had a complex business plan (Hunt 1990, pp. 151-2) . They collected papal contributions in England, in particular from monasteries. The contributions were then used to advance funds to English growers, monasteries being prominent among them, to secure a steady delivery of wool. The Pope, in Avignon, would receive his dues from the home office in Florence. This arrangement minimized the export and import of specie, which was subject to large transportation and security costs. The sovereign, the other party in these transactions, provided protection to the merchant-bankers who repaid it by lending to the cash-strapped sovereign. The return on the loan came in part as disguised interest (to bypass canon law against usury) and in part as monopoly rights. As Edward Hunt (p. 152) puts it, "Merchant-bankers were primarily merchants who counted on trade for most of their profits. Banking for princes was thus mainly a means to this end."
The environment was risky and failure rates were high. A well-known story is the collapse (Molho 1994) . After a few false starts, it became very popular: the investment was much better than Monte Comune shares in terms of yields and market risk. Initially, a father could deposit into the Fund 100 florins for each of his daughters for a term of either seven and half years or fifteen years, yielding an annual compound interest rate of 12.99% and 11.33%, respectively. If the daughter died before the deposit maturity, the yield would be zero and the initial amount of the deposit was returned to the father (Molho 1994, pp. 34-8) . With the probability of payment before the age of 20 estimated at approximately 0.75, the expected annual yield of a 15-year deposit was 8.5 per cent. This was the current yield on Monte Comune shares in 1425 (Conti, p. 34) , but these shares carried a very substantial market risk.
Hence, it is not surprising that the Dowry Fund grew in relation to the Monte Comune: it combined aspects of a social insurance system with promised yields that were competitive with the current yields of the risky Monte Comune shares. The Dowry Fund failed to meet the second objective, the reduction of government debt. It ceased at the end of Republican Florence in 1530 (Conti, p. 69) .
In sum, foreign trade and financial innovations launched the great financial center of
Florence. The decline of the center coincided with negative shocks to the economy and to trade patterns (exclude wars because these were a universal features of city-states). Ultimately, the end of Florence was the consequence of the rise of Genoa, the new powerhouse in banking and finance of much of the 1500s and the early part of the 1600s.
Venice
The biggest, although not the first by all means, Venetian contribution to banking was in the field of so-called public banks. Wisselbank, was a monopolist and centralized the clearing mechanism. Since payments through the giro system were less costly than with specie settlements, a premium emerged for payments in banco relative to those in specie.
The Banco Giro was launched to manage Venice's floating debt. The bank lent to government at short maturities and obtained, in exchange, that its deposit liabilities be treated as legal tender (Day 1987, p. 153) . In other words, the Banco Giro was in fact an issue bank, just like the later Bank of England, but with one difference: the Giro issued bookkeeping entries, whereas the Bank of England issued bank notes. The Giro deposits, like the Rialto deposits, enjoyed a premium with respect to currency, the economics being the same. Over time, the Banco Giro out-muscled and out-competed the Banco di Rialto because of the close connection it had with government.
In sum, the contributions of Venice to banking was to have created two institutions that (Conklin 1998, p. 499) . The silver was shipped to Venice and from there to the Far East to settle a trade deficit. In exchange, the Genoese received bills drawn on Antwerp where they were used to buy gold. To these transactions, which brought into equilibrium a web of long and short positions through the use of credit (Braudel, p. 168; Conklin, p. 499) , one must add credit, which centered around exchange fairs.
Exchange fairs were periodic financial centers; they took place typically four times a year and lasted several days. The Genoese started their own fairs in Besançon in France in1535 and then moved them to Piacenza in Northern Italy in 1579. Their objective was to centralize money and exchange transactions in Europe (Da Silva 1969, p. 36) . But also a credit market operated at the fairs. The demand for credit came not only from merchants who wanted their bills renewed but also from new borrowers like kings facing budget deficits; the supply from individuals and business who had placed their savings with merchant-bankers. 8 The Genoese merchant-bankers channeled vast amounts of entrusted deposits into short-term loans (asientos) to the Spanish
Crown. Against the asientos the Genoese received from the Crown collateral in the form of longterm securities (juros de resguardo). 9 Since the interest rate on the juros flowed back to the Crown, the transaction worked out to be an interest rate swap, with the fixed flow going to the Crown and the floating flow to the Genoese. The Genoese earned the difference between the higher short-term interest rate and the lower long-term rate. 10 Furthermore, asientos loan contracts specified that the juros received as collateral would be sold if the Crown did not repay the loans. The Genoese received permission to sell the juros with the stipulation that they would be restored if the Crown paid the asientos (Lovett 1980, p. 905) . Thus, the Genoese recovered immediately the initial capital lent to the Crown. If the Crown defaulted, the bankers gained the interest rate differential on the swap. If the Crown did not default, the bankers would make a capital gain by repurchasing the juros in the secondary market at a price below the price at which they sold.
It may be insightful to quote what a modern merchant banker like Sir David Scholey, at the time Chairman of S.G. Warburg Group in London, thinks of the Genoese system just described:
"This Genoese system of international finance stands alone in history up until the present day as an example of an IFC [international financial center] built not so much on locally based trade or primarily on a local surplus (although both elements were present), but rather on an efficient and sophisticated system for gathering the monetary surpluses of other parties, in part through a process of -to use a familiar phrase-securitization, or the extension of paper credit. Although Amsterdam in the 18 th century and London in the 19 th century also based many of their financial activities on the issuance and discounting of securities, these were backed primarily by increasing volumes of trade and of surplus capital which were centred locally." (Scholey 1994, pp. 31-2) .
In addition to international finance, the Genoese made two other significant financial innovations.
11 The first was the Casa di San Giorgio, a financial institution created in 1407 as a result of the consolidation of Genoa's public debt. San Giorgio's shareholders acquired all previous debt issues of the Republic of Genoa and performed what today would be called a debtfor-equity swap (Fratianni 2006) . The swap would be done again in England in 1697, when the Bank of England began "engrafting" government debt onto the bank's capital (Neal 1990, p. 51) .
Economic historians have considered the conversion of debt into equity as a successful element of the English financial revolution because it helped to transform high transaction cost and difficultto trade debt instruments into transferable and liquid shares (Neal 1990, pp. 96-7) .
The other innovation was the Banco di San Giorgio, a unit of the Casa. The Banco was a public bank with the primary mission of facilitating the management of the San Giorgio's shares, called luoghi (Sieveking 1906, p. 46) . It closed to external business in 1445 but continued to serve the state, San Giorgio's shareholders, tax collectors and suppliers. It reopened for business to the general public in 1530 and was permanently closed in 1805. The
Banco handled deposits, specie transactions, loans, and interest payments on luoghi. Deposit accounts were used by customers to settle payments. The giro system reduced the use of scarce specie and raised the velocity of narrowly defined money. The bankers from the Banco, with other Genoese bankers, performed exactly the same function at the Besançon and Piacenza fairs but at an international level.
As a public bank, the Banco di San Giorgio had to guarantee that the depositor could receive specie on demand. Despite this constraint, the Banco extended loans to the Republic, tax farmers, and its own clients by allowing deposit accounts to run overdrafts (Assini, 270) . These were exchanged among clients as part of an extended credit network. Interest in the form of dividends on San Giorgio luoghi were credited in the accounts of the owners four times a year but before they could be cashed (Assini 1995, p. 277) . Payment delay on dividends fluctuated from nine months to a few years. The books registered the date of maturity of the dividends and owners, who had claims on future cash flow, would use the declared but unpaid dividends to extinguish a debt, settling the difference between the maturity of the dividend and the maturity of the debt through discounting. Dividends were actively exchanged at their own money of account, groats. If the first exchange rate is defined as the spot exchange rate and the second the future exchange rate, one can apply interest rate parity and readily see that when the future rate exceeds the spot rate the home currency (in this case the groat) is at a discount in relation to the foreign currency (in this case the ducat) and consequently interest rates in Antwerp must be higher than interest rates in Venice. Thus, profit from the two-way bill arises from borrowing in the lowinterest rate location and lending in the high-interest rate location. 12 Forward premia and discounts on exchange rates were quoted in the Antwerp bourse.
Forward transactions were considered no more than waging bets and met with public disapproval and official sanctions. dedicates several pages to speculation and excesses taking place at the Antwerp bourse. This is not surprising given the imperfect knowledge of the time on the purposes of derivatives. There was a consensus that forward contracts were tantamount to taking chances or manipulating prices rather than managing risk. time and the cost of protecting the envoys was higher. Gelderblom and Jonker (2004, pp. 648-9) report that fitting a ship for the Asian trade would cost 100,000 guilders and that 20 per cent of this investment, on average, would be lost due to a variety of misfortunes, including piracy; furthermore, capital would be tied for approximately 24 months. The sums involved were such to spur the organizational innovation of the joint-stock company. In 1602, the States-General of the Netherlands gave the VOC a monopoly on Asian trade. VOC consolidated all previous Dutch trade companies and became, in the words of Braudel (1992, p. 213) , "an independent power, a state within a state…" This is the same phrase Machiavelli (1965, pp. 494-5) (Neal 2005, p. 171) . 17 Initial price of shares was 3,000 guilders. 18 The archival material on options and futures is rather thin; see Gelderblom and Jonker (2005, pp. 199-200) . also a first on behavioral finance, including profiles and underlying psychology of different types of investors. More importantly, de la Vega's account is evidence that the success of the illegal (but tolerated) derivative contracts depended, not on government regulations and the enforcement of the courts, but on the reputation of brokers and market participants (Stringham 2003) .
The Amsterdam Exchange was much more than the trading building; it included also the grain exchange, the Chamber of Insurance, the adjacent coffee and tea houses where brokers congregated, and the Wisselbank (Israel 1990, p. 412) . As I have already mentioned, the latter was patterned after the Venetian Banco di Rialto. The Wisselbank had a monopoly on money changing, bills of exchange valued in excess of 600 guilders, and bullion transactions. Merchants were to bring all foreign coins to the bank and received credit in deposit accounts denominated in bank guilders. The Wisselbank was at the center of the Dutch payment mechanism. In the absence of bank fees, money settlements through the giro system-that is, by debiting and crediting deposit accounts with the bank-were cheaper and faster than settlements using coins. Bank fees on coins deposited in a bank account raised the premium on deposits and lowered the incentive to settle payments with deposits. A rise in uncertainty, caused for example by wars, raised the premium on specie and raised the incentive to settle payments with deposit transfers. The movements of the agio were self correcting and "… the Dutch were able to reap the advantages of a fixed exchange rate for their international trade and finance, encouraging their own merchants as well as foreign merchants to use their financing facilities for long-distance trade and long-term finance. At the same time, they were able to maintain the shock absorber benefits of a flexible exchange rate for their domestic economic activity" (Neal 2000, 122) .
In sum, Amsterdam became a leading financial center through its secondary market in equities. In the words of Gelderblom and Jonker (2004, p. 666) , "…the course of events in Holland after 1600 runs counter to common opinion about the importance of a publicly traded government debt as the origin of secondary markets." Yet, for a careful scholar like Larry Neal the Dutch, despite the remarkable innovations and efficiency of their payment mechanism, failed to achieve the success of the English financial revolution. The reason is that the provincial structure of the United Provinces was an obstacle to the creation of "a truly national debt backed by a national taxing authority" (Neal 2000, p. 123 ). This conclusion is even more remarkable if one recalls that the Dutch exported their financial techniques, human and non-human capital to London when William of Orange, the Stadholder of the United Provinces, became king of England in 1688.
The Anglo-American centers While there are several important financial centers today, two stand out, London and New York, and both share a common culture and language. Government finance, we recall, was the engine of the English financial revolution and the ascendancy of London as a financial center. The problem was how could government raise large amounts of funds to pay for an increasingly activist commercial and foreign policy in direct competition with France first and the Dutch later.
The solution was found in a strong commitment mechanism to honor debt and reduce credit risk; financial instruments that were appealing to investors in terms of yields, maturity, transferability and liquidity; and either financial institutions or financial markets which would make these characteristics happen. Economic historians are in agreement that the English implemented what the Dutch had done. This is true, except that the evolutionary chain of finance is longer than that:
the Genoese of the 15 th century had faced a similar problem and came up with a solution somewhat similar to the English solution. The Genoese entrusted their commitment mechanism to San Giorgio. San Giorgio was structured and governed to ensure that the Republic would honor its debts (Fratianni 2006) . The latter were funded by alienated taxes, collected and administered by San Giorgio itself. San Giorgio was created with a debt-for-equity swap, or what the English called much later engraftment; its shares had low credit risk and were transferable. In England, the commitment mechanism resided with the Parliament that had superseded the divine rights of the monarch (North and Weingast 1989, p. 824) . Government debt was placed with joint-stock companies such as the Bank of England, the Million Bank, the East India Company and most of all with the South Sea Company (Neal 1990, p. 51) .
The Bank of England was created in 1694 with a capital subscription of 1.2 million pounds to finance a loan to government of an equal amount at an 8 per cent rate of interest. The
Bank was restrained from lending to the Crown unless explicitly authorized by Parliament (North and Weingast, 821) . This authorization acted as an effective constraint imposed by creditors on debtor and thus lowered default risk. Just like San Giorgio, the Bank of England was in a position to represent and coordinate with ease all creditors. The lower coordination costs, in turn, implied a larger punishment on the defaulting debtor, and hence a lower credit risk of government (Wells and Wills 2000, 422) .
The South Sea Company came into existence in 1711 with a very large (over 9 million pounds) purchase of short-term government debt and the assignment of monopoly rights to trade in South America (Dickson 1967 , Table 5 ). Then, in 1720, a law was passed whereby all of the national debt -except that held by the Bank of England and the East India Company-would be sold to the South Sea Company; in other words, a complete takeover of English public borrowing.
This takeover had been inspired by John Law's takeover of French debt in 1719 through his Mississippi Company (Murphy 1997, ch. 14) . The sound economic principle underlying debt conversion was the gain associated in transforming high transaction cost and difficult-to-trade debt instruments into transferable and liquid shares (Neal 1990, pp. 96-7) . But the management of the South Sea Company were keen in driving up share prices through margin sales, "The basic outlines of the Anglo-American structure of finance were set by 1723 --complementary sets of private and commercial and merchants banks, with all enjoying continuous access to an active, liquid secondary market for financial assets, especially for government debt."
In France, instead, the crisis did not elicit any policy response. It was left to fester mistrust in the monetary and financial system. The result was a rejection of markets and a delayed financial deepening (Baskin and Miranti 1997, pp. 113-115 ).
London's ascendancy matured for much of the 1700s and was fully completed by the end of the century, after the English defeated the Dutch in the Baltic naval war (Cassis 2006, p. 19) .
London stood out for the depth and breath of its financial services. Its preeminence in the international acceptance market was such to have earned the attribution of "the clearing house of 20 See Neal (1990, Table 4 .1 and Figure 4 .4) for the data on the explosion of bank notes issued by Banque Royale and on the Mississippi bubble. 21 Further boost to the power of the Bank had come in 1707, when the Parliament gave the Bank the monopoly on joint-stock banking in England and made its notes legal tender; and in1715, when the Bank began managing the national debt, thus re-enforcing its role as the fiscal agent of the state. the world;" and bills of exchange denominated in pound sterlings were considered an "international currency" (Baster 1937, p. 294) . 22 Merchant-banks made the acceptance a marketable security. Exporters, not only would be guaranteed payment, but could obtain its present value immediately. Importers, on the other hand, could disburse funds after having received delivery of the goods. London merchant banks were also preeminent in sovereign lending, a service that had begun in Amsterdam (Riley 1980, chs. 5-7) and had moved to London with the assistance of Dutch merchant-banks. 23 The House of Rothschild epitomized the importance and the power of merchant banks in financing foreign governments. They were the modern Bardis, Peruzzis, Medicis, and Fuggers, but without the excesses that come by being too close to debtors. The major innovation of the Rothcschilds was to create a true international bond market for sovereign loans. It started in 1818 with a loan to Prussia denominated in sterling, with interest payable in London, and other British features (Ferguson 1998, pp. 124-5) ; in other words, what today we would call a Eurobond. As a result, British investors did not bear a currency risk and could evaluate the difference between the Prussian loan and British government bonds in terms of differences in credit risk. The loan was also placed in Amsterdam, Berlin, Frankfurt, Hamburg and Vienna, making it a global loan.
The merchant bankers were one among the pillars of the London financial center. A large army of deposit bankers, discount bankers, central bankers, insurers, jobbers, stockbrokers, investment trust specialists, chartered accountants, and lawyers provided a dense concentration of highly specialized human capital that fed the growing and innovative markets for securities, gold, commodities, ship chartering, and insurance. The result was a distinctive and well-oiled machinery, with each piece fitting into a complex puzzle:
22 With an acceptance a party, typically a merchant banker, guarantees the payment of the bill should the drawer defualt. Bills of exchange, we recall, were early medieval instruments used to finance international trade. 23 Baring Brothers of London learned the business of foreign lending through its association with Hope & Co. of Amsterdam; see Cassis (2006, p. 20) .
"…[M]erchant banks…accepted…the bills of exchange, generally for three months, that constituted the main instrument for financing international trade…Well before they reached their maturity dates, they were discounted, also by specialised banking housesthe discount houses-which then resold them to various British or foreign banks…[T]he clearing banks provided cash, in the form of day-to-day loans, to discount houses that discounted the bills of exchange accepted by the merchant banks…[T]he beneficiaries of these bills of exchange-wholesale dealers, merchants and industrialists-replaced the liquid assets that they had obtained through discounting them in the deposit banks. It was the deposit banks that made the whole wheel of international trade financing turn. The Bank of England had pride of place at the top of the edifice, guaranteeing the country's gold reserves, essential to the smooth running of the system… [M]erchant banks also specialised in issuing loans on behalf of foreign companies and governments…These securities were then traded on the London Stock Exchange…This huge market too was sustained by money at call supplied to stockbrokers by the deposit banks…" (Cassis 2006, pp. 84-85) .
The London Stock Exchange had no challengers at home. According to Lance Davis and Larry Neal (1998) , this resulted from the separation of ownership of the Exchange from its operation. Owners wanted to maximize fees from membership and minimize the risk of inducing the emergence of competing exchanges, whereas Member of the Exchange wanted to maximize volume of transactions upon which commissions were charged. The outcome was a very competitive environment with a rapidly increasing number of traders that made it difficult to make collusive agreements. In contrast, the owners of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) limited the number of traders and colluded to have minimum commissions. Consequently, the NYSE faced national competition, even within the perimeter of the city.
London was at the center of global finance during the heyday of the gold standard . Foreign issues exceeded domestic issues; in fact, as much as one-third of world negotiable securities were trade there at the start of World War I (Davis and Neal, p. 40) . The strong foreign orientation has remained a London characteristic to these days.
The United States went through a financial revolution a century after the British. Unlike the British Parliament, the U.S. Congress did not share power with a king and could legitimately raise taxes for servicing the Federal debt. This was done in 1789-90 by pledging customs duties and excise taxes to pay interest on debt in hard money, the U.S. dollar linked to gold and silver (Sylla 1998, p. 86) . Alexander Hamilton and the Federalists saw in the national debt an instrument of consolidating the Union. With funded debt came a public bank, the First Bank of the United States, established in 1791. The Fist Bank was patterned after the Bank of England, except that its notes, unlike those of the Bank of England, were subject to a 100 per cent specie requirement (Cowen 2000, p. 12) . Like the Bank of England, the First Bank was more a national bank than a central bank. It lent to the Federal government, paid interests on government securities held in Europe (mainly in Amsterdam and London), held government deposits, and transferred these deposits and its own notes throughout the country (Cowen, .
There was strong opposition to the First Bank. Thomas Jefferson, Hamilton's nemesis, had a vision of a decentralized agrarian republic. He disliked paper money because prone to losses of purchasing power and the banks that issued it. If banks were "dangerous," a monopoly bank he thought was outright "evil. In the first approximation, the New York capital market was not that different from
London's, except in foreign trade financing where it was far behind at the start of the 20 th century; part of the reason was due to the legal impediment, until 1914, for national banks to accept bills of exchange (Cassis, p. 122 Reed (1981) ranks international financial centers for much of the 20 th century using hierarchical cluster analysis and setpwise multiple discriminant analysys. London and New York are always at the top. In banking, London prevails over New York; see Table 2 .2. In finance, New York was higher than London in 1955, but falls behind London in 1965 London in , 1975 London in and 1980 see Table 2 .4 in Reed.
a durable center and has renewed itself repeatedly through innovation. New York has benefited from the effects of those shocks that should have impacted London negatively, but has suffered from legislation and rules designed to limit the comparative advantages of New York as a money market center and to maintain a regionalized banking system.
IV. EVALUATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CONCENTRATION
Our long historical excursion confirms the basic proposition of Kindleberger's 1974 essay: namely, that the N-1 argument applies to money as well as to financial centers. Strong economies of scale are realized by financial centers; in the case of New York, these economies were so compelling to overcome a hostile political culture and a legislation against geographic concentration. Economies of scale also explain the relative persistence of these centers; when decline occurs, it tends to be slow. Kindleberger appears to be also correct about the positive correlation between great centers and great monies. At least five of the seven centers surveyed had internationally accepted monies: the florin in Florence, the ducat in Venice, the guilder in Amsterdam and, in more recent times, the pound in London and the dollar in New York. Fourth, great financial centers develop on the foundation of great banking centers.
One aspect Kindleberger did not emphasize was the nexus between financial centers and accountable institutions. Florence, Venice, Genoa, the Dutch, the English and the Americans shared, to various degrees, democratic institutions and developed commitment mechanisms to honor their public debts. There were differences in the mechanism. In Genoa, current government spending had to match current borrowing, primarily from San Giorgio. In Venice and to a lesser extent in Florence, elected government set tax rates and forced borrowing to match As to financial instruments, Genoa was the most innovative of the three Italian citystates. San Giorgio effected the earliest recorded case of a debt-for-equity swap. The same type of swap was repeated approximately three hundred years later by the Bank of England, the Million Bank, the South Sea Company, and John Law's Mississippi Company. In Genoa, the swap, coupled with a sound governance structure that compressed credit risk for San Giorgio's shareholders, permitted the Republic of Genoa to borrow large amounts of debt at a low cost. The transformation of high transaction cost and difficult-to-trade debt instruments into transferable and liquid shares also reduced interest rates in England. Ultimately, however, in England and
France the swap was mishandled by poor governance structures and political corruption and ineptitude that facilitated big bubbles. The Genoese were the first financiers to fully exploit the international payment mechanism, using credit instruments instead of costly specie transfers. In international trade finance, the lineage goes from Genoa of the 16 th century to Amsterdam of the 18 th century to London of the 19 th century, and so on. Genoese bankers at the Spanish court of Phillip II used juros, obtained as collateral for short-term loans, to earn an interest rate spread between short and long-term interest rates, thus being on record for the possibly first interest rate swap in history.
In Antwerp of the 15 th century starts the history of exchanges and secondary markets and Consolidation is consistent with a deepening of economies of scale. Improvements in communication and information technology and the breakdown in financial borders favor the further expansion of leading international financial centers. By stretching their global reach, these centers can lower costs by sharing common trading platform, while providing the benefit of deeper liquidity (Pagano 1989) . The evolution of financial centers suggests that organized exchanges are best suited for low transaction cost and deep secondary markets.
V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Financial products are unstandardized and subject to a great deal of uncertainty. Geographical (Martin 1999) . The trend towards increasing concentration of capital markets is not inconsistent with the existence of local capital markets. Small and medium-size firms have not the characteristics to accede to large centralized markets; hence, the reason why local capital markets can survive along side concentrated markets.
